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ra
ct Energy markets are an important contemporary siteof economic globalization. In this article we use a
global production network (GPN) approach to ex-
amine the evolutionary dynamics of the liquefied
natural gas (LNG) sector and its role in an emerging
global market for natural gas. We extend recent
work in the relational economic geography literature
on the organizational practices by which production
networks are assembled and sustained over time and
space; and we address a significantly underdevel-
oped aspect of GPN research by demonstrating the
implications of these practices for the territoriality
of GPNs. The article introduces LNG as a techno-
material reconfiguration of natural gas that enables
it to be moved and sold beyond the continental
limits of pipelines. We briefly outline the evolving
scale and geographic scope of LNG trade, and intro-
duce the network of firms, extraeconomic actors,
and intermediaries through which LNG production,
distribution, and marketing are coordinated. Our
analysis shows how LNG is evolving from a rela-
tively simple floating pipeline model of point-to-
point, binational flows orchestrated by producing
and consuming companies and governed by long-
term contracts, to a more geographic and organiza-
tionally complex production network that is consti-
tutive of an emergent global gas market. Empirically
the article provides the first systematic analysis
within economic geography of the globalization of
the LNG sector and its influence on global gas
markets, demonstrating the potential of GPN (and
related frameworks) to contribute meaningful analy-
sis of the contemporary political economy of energy.
Conceptually the article pushes research on GPN to
realize more fully its potential as an analysis of
network territoriality by examining how the spatial
configuration of GPNs emerges from the organiza-
tional structures and coordinating strategies of firms,
extraeconomic actors and intermediaries; and by
recognizing how network territoriality is constitutive
of markets rather than merely responsive to them.
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Spatially dispersed production networks are wide-
ly acknowledged as a significant organizational form
within the global economy. The territorial configu-
ration of global production networks (GPNs) and
value chains, however, remains an underdeveloped
analytical theme in the economic geography litera-
ture. As a consequence, the relationship between
network territoriality and practices of network coor-
dination is not well understood. A better understand-
ing of the territoriality of production networks, and
how territoriality emerges from the coordinating
strategies of firms, extraeconomic actors, and
intermediaries, is necessary if economic geography
is to provide richer analyses of their geoeconomic/
geopolitical consequences and the mutually consti-
tutive character of spatial and organizational form.
In this article, we use a GPN approach to examine
the evolutionary dynamics of the liquefied natural
gas (LNG) supply chain and its role in an emerging
global market for natural gas.
Energy markets are an important contemporary
site of political–economic change, shaped by a com-
bination of economic policy goals (e.g., market lib-
eralization and supply competition), geopolitical and
geoeconomic shifts in power (with associated con-
cerns about energy security), and environmental
objectives (e.g., climate change mitigation and
urban air quality). An earlier generation of geo-
graphic researchers recognized the significance of
energy markets and the importance of understanding
their structural and dynamic features in accounting
for the geographies of economic activity. Manners
(1964), for example, placed market demand at the
center of his survey of The Geography of Energy
and its influence on economic development; the
eight editions of Odell’s (1970) classic Oil and
World Power highlighted the role of oil markets in
shaping geopolitical relations during one of the most
turbulent periods in the sector’s history; and
Chapman’s (1989) Geography and Energy:
Commercial Systems and National Policies exam-
ined the organizational and spatial structure of elec-
tricity, oil, and gas markets. However, despite the
enduring importance of energy markets, it is only
recently that they have again become a focus of
attention within geography (for a recent review, see
Calvert 2016). International markets for natural gas
are currently undergoing profound change. Gas con-
sumption worldwide has grown 25 percent in the last
decade, with projections of a Golden Age of Gas
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buoyed by surging shale gas production in the United States, large conventional gas
discoveries (e.g., offshore East Africa, eastern Mediterranean, and Australia), and fuel
switching in power and urban transport sectors. In many national contexts, the shift
toward gas has been facilitated by energy market deregulation, major infrastructural
investment (e.g., in pipelines and import terminals), and environmental regulation that
valorizes the lower particulate and greenhouse gas emissions of gas relative to coal or
oil (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2011, 2014). However, the most significant
process transforming international gas markets—and the focus of this article—is the
increasing integration of geographically discrete markets for gas and, for the first time,
the prospect of a global gas market emerging similar to that for oil. Central to this
process has been a growing seaborne natural gas trade, in the form of LNG, which
increasingly enables gas to be moved and sold beyond the continental limits of
pipelines. As we show, however, growth in LNG trade is accompanied by a deeper
process of integration associated with cross-border production networks for making,
selling, and transporting LNG—what is commonly referred to as the LNG supply
chain. These GPNs for LNG stretch from upstream gas extraction to downstream gas
consumption via intermediate processes of gas processing, liquefaction, shipping, and
regasification. We show how the territorial form of these production networks is
evolving, along with the organizational practices through which they are held together,
and how the manner of their evolution is bringing a global gas market into being.
The contributions of the article, therefore, are threefold. The article provides the first
systematic analysis within economic geography of the globalization of the LNG sector
and its influence on global gas markets. In doing so, it demonstrates the potential of
GPN to contribute meaningful analysis of the contemporary political economy of
energy. Second, this article critically extends recent work in the relational economic
geography literature on the organizational practices by which production networks are
assembled and sustained over time and space. We agree with Murphy (2012, 211) that
GPN/global value chain (GVC) research has yet to develop fully an “empirically
informed exposition of how different production network configurations develop
through the actions of agents,” and we see value in his call for a “process-sensitive
approach” attuned to the “process(es) through which network linkages are established,
sustained, and reorganized over time and space” (ibid.). The article responds to this
call, examining how LNG production networks are scaled and sustained by focusing on
the practices that hold together different network actors. Third, by foregrounding the
concept of territoriality, we address an underrealized potential of the GPN approach for
examining the implications of network practices for the territorial configuration of
GPNs. We concur with Coe and Yeung (2015, 35) that, to date, “the territoriality of
global production networks is elusive and under-developed.” By paying attention to the
spatial configuration of LNG production networks, we are able to show how, in the
case of natural gas, GPNs are constitutive of markets—market making—rather than
merely responsive to them.
The remainder of the article is organized into four sections. The next section
contextualizes the article’s conceptual and empirical contributions via a review of
recent work in GPN. Following that, we provide a brief introduction to the LNG sector
and outline our methods and approach. The penultimate section presents our analysis of
geographic and organizational change in LNG production networks. We identify three
organizational trends reshaping the spatial configuration of LNG production network,
and show how they are eroding the dominance of a long-established business model in
LNG (what we refer to as the floating pipeline). We examine contract terms and other
network development practices (Murphy 2012) associated with these organizational
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changes, and explain how they introduce significant sources of geographic flexibility
and uncertainty into the LNG production network. The final section concludes by
considering the wider implications of the article’s analysis of organizational and
geographic shifts in LNG production networks.
Unfinished Business: Extending Territoriality, Materiality,
and Network Practices within GPN Research
Contemporary social science has a rich set of heuristics for understanding the
political economy of globalization and, in particular, for examining how spatially
distributed economic activity is functionally coordinated. Some derive from studies
of international trade and take the commodity as their analytical unit; others emerge
from industry studies and focus on issues of value chain management, innovation, and
sectoral governance; still others highlight the dialectical interplay of territorial and
network coherence, and allow for a broad range of economic actors beyond the firm.
As readers of this journal will know well, economic geographers have played a
significant role in developing a broad family of relational approaches for understanding
the interconnectedness, organization, and coordination of industrial sectors that
includes work on global commodity chains (GCCs, e.g., Hughes and Reimer 2004),
GVCs (e.g., Ponte and Gibbon 2005) and GPNs (Coe 2012). The GPN approach is the
most spatially sensitive member of this family with its embrace of multiple geographic
scales, recognition of a plurality of economic actors extending beyond the firm, and
attentiveness to the unevenness of regional development outcomes. A GPN approach
focuses on the relationship between the geographic extensification of economic activi-
ties and the activities’ organizational integration and coordination. It was initially
developed as a tool for understanding changes in the geographic organization of
manufacturing and services at the world scale, and examining the implications for
regional development of the internationalization of economic activity (Henderson et al.
2002; Coe et al. 2004; Dicken 2015). Consistent with its materialist origins, the GPN
approach seeks to understand how existing interactions—around price formation or
product design, for example—are outcomes of the distribution of power within a
production network and, furthermore, how these interactions are generative of new
organizational and geographic forms. Production networks, then, are understood as
“organisational platforms through which actors in different regional and national
economies compete and co-operate for a greater share of value creation, transforma-
tion, and capture though geographically dispersed economic activity” (Yeung and Coe
2015, 30). The point here is not simply that production networks are dynamic over
space and time, but that network spatio-temporality is an emergent property and arises
from interactions among a network’s constituent parts.
The GPN approach’s capacity for understanding the mutually constitutive character
of spatial configuration and network organization makes it well suited to analyzing
economic sectors whose organizational and geographic structures are in a state of flux.
So far, the center of gravity of the GPN research framework has been manufacturing,
where it has been adopted to understand functional and geographic integration in a
range of sectors from aircraft (Bowen 2007) and automobiles (Isaksen and Kalsaas
2009) to textiles (Tokatli, Wrigley, and Kizilgün 2008) and wood products (Murphy
2012; Gibson and Warren 2016). However, recent work has taken GPN into less
familiar terrain, to examine producer services such as temporary staffing (Coe,
Johns, and Ward 2011), freight forwarding (Bowen and Leinbach 2006; Rodrigue
2006), the creative sector (Johns 2006; Yoon and Malecki 2010), and extractive
4
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industries (Bridge 2008; Steen and Underthun 2011; Bridge and Le Billon 2013;
MacKinnon 2013). These studies have expanded the sectoral reach of GPN research
but have also highlighted some of its conceptual limits and opportunities for further
development. We are drawn to GPN’s spatially sensitive relational approach and its
advantage in this regard over GCC and GVC approaches: we think GPN’s geographic
sensitivity has the capacity to generate novel insights about the evolution of the LNG
sector that make an original contribution to energy studies. However, we also think
GPN’s potential as a distinctively geographic mode of analysis is underdeveloped and
can be enhanced by attending to three conceptual elements: GPN’s account of territo-
riality, understanding of materiality and material transformation, and interest in net-
work practices. The case of LNG foregrounds these limitations, while at the same time
suggesting how attending to them can advance research utilizing GPN and other
relational approaches.
Territoriality
The spatial reordering of manufacturing at the global scale provided the initial
impetus for early work on global shift and the exercise of global reach in fragmented
economic networks (Dicken 1986). However, explicit attention to the spatial configu-
ration of networks has more recently taken a backseat in GPN research in preference
for more parsimonious modes of explanation and theory-building in relation to network
organization and processes of strategic coupling between leading global firms and local
actors (e.g., Lee, Heo, and Kim 2014; Mahutga 2014). We think the concept of
territoriality is an underdeveloped conceptual resource for more closely examining
the territorial configuration of networks and the value activities of which they are
comprised. In general terms, territoriality describes “the process by which individual
and collective social actors define, bind, reify and control space toward some social
end” (Steinberg 1994, 3). The concept draws attention to the way in which particular
geographies (i.e., a specific territorial configuration, combining elements of both
geographic reach and interaction with place) are integral to the exercise of economic
and political power (Brenner et al. 2003). Territoriality initially piqued interest within
political geography as a way of thinking about the practices that produce and maintain
territory (see, e.g., Taylor 1994; Paasi 1998). Its capacities for de-naturalizing spatial
form, and for linking spatial form with strategic practice, subsequently encouraged its
application within a wider range of political–economic accounts. The potential for
economic geography of theorizing “the territoriality behind territory” was noted early
on by Steinberg (1994) in the context of the new industrial geography, although it was
not directly taken up. The concept’s capacity for hinging spatial form with political–
economic power was enough to give territoriality a fleeting role within the first
generation of GPN research (e.g., Hess 2004). Yet it remained a marginal term within
GPN 1.0, overshadowed by GPN 1.0’s conceptual trinity of power, embeddedness, and
value.
Coe and Yeung (2015) recently highlighted territoriality’s analytical potential as part
of a GPN 2.0. For them, territoriality comprises vertical and horizontal dimensions of
production networks: the former refers to the spatial scope or geographic reach of
different economic actors (on a scalar continuum from global to local) within a
production network; and the latter refers to the territorial interfaces among value
activities that have different spatial expressions (for example, some may be highly
localized and others expressed as regional clusters). Schematic and provisional, we
nonetheless find this framework a useful starting point as it recenters the question of
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spatial configuration within GPN research. It has long been acknowledged within GPN
research that GPNs are spatially fragmented and discontinuously territorial, but the
problem of global shift—that is, how the territorial configuration of production net-
works evolves in relation to the generation and capture of value—has not been a core
research focus in recent years. The analytical value of territoriality in this task, we
suggest, is that it foregrounds the particularity of a network’s territorial configuration
(why this spatial form, why now?) and links this form to strategic intent (for what ends,
with what effects?). It is, then, more than a fancy synonym for describing a network’s
complex spatial form as we retain the processual and evolutionary understanding
associated with its initial application—that is, territoriality points to the practices
undertaken by network actors to establish, maintain, and adapt a production network’s
territorial form.
As we will show, the LNG production network is rapidly evolving: its organizational
structures are diversifying and the spatial rules that have characterized LNG produc-
tion and consumption for nearly fifty years are changing in ways that are economically
and geopolitically significant (cf. Glassman 2011). Importantly, these organizational,
territorial, and geopolitical dimensions are not captured by conventional analyses that
understand the geographies of LNG through the lens of binational trade flows.
Conventional analyses readily show LNG consumption to be growing, and the number
of producing and consuming countries and firms to be increasing, but say very little
about how the global shift under way in LNG (and gas markets more generally) arises
from significant organizational changes in LNG production networks. The concept of
territoriality provides a way to think about the evolving spatial configuration of LNG
production networks, its relationship with the relative power of different network
actors, and geographic and geopolitical consequences.
Materiality
A significant strand of recent work in economic geography has called for greater attention
to thematerial transformations at the heart of GPNs and commodity chains. Building on calls
to better understand the “influence materiality exerts on industrial organization” (Bridge
2008, 415; see also Boyd, Prudham, and Schurman 2001; Prudham 2005; Hudson 2008), this
work explores the significance of materials, and biological, chemical, and mechanical
processes, within GVCs. The central provocation of these accounts is that the heterogeneity
of materials and the variability of biophysical processes enables and shapes a production
network’s spatial and organizational form in ways that are economically significant, yet
underappreciated. A logical starting point for investigating how materials matter has been
nature-facing primary sectors, such as forestry, fisheries, mining, and agriculture, which are
strongly characterized by seasonality, biological reproduction times, and geological and
ecological variability. Ciccantell and Smith (2009) argued that material and locational
attributes of the primary sector influence production networks in distinctive ways: they
highlight, for example, how large and lumpy capital investments are frequently required to
mobilize raw materials via ports and pipelines, and the dynamic interaction of scale econo-
mies in raw material production and transportation (see also Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).
Gibson andWarren’s (2016) description of a “resource-sensitive global production networks”
showed how shortages of traditional hardwoods (which have prized qualities of resonance,
strength, and beauty) and environmental regulation influence the organization and spatiality
of acoustic guitar manufacturing, leading to both fragmentation and concentration within the
production chain. In a similar way, Crang et al.’s (2013) research on economies of waste
highlighted the profound heterogeneity of materials encountered in waste flows and how the
6
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corresponding need for fine-grained sorting gives intermediary brokers (rather than large lead
firms) a key role within waste value chains because of their capacity for assessing material
quality.
The primary insight of these different studies is to problematize accounts of production,
exchange, and consumption by emphasizing how production networks are organized
around moments of material transformation, in which the (biological, chemical, physical)
qualities of materials shape strategies for value capture. To call attention to materiality in
this context, then, is to emphasize the political–economic possibilities and limitations of
material qualities, and their influence on the organizational and spatial structures of energy
regimes (Birch and Calvert 2015). In the case of LNG, for example, production networks
are structured around the flow of gas from the upstream wellhead to the downstream
consumer as part of an overall value creation process.1 At the core of the production
network are material exchanges and transformations associated with extracting, proces-
sing, liquefying, shipping, regasifying, distributing, and consuming gas (Figure 1).
Representing the production network as a series of physical input–output structures
enables consideration of how infrastructural assets and the technological division of
labor associated with long-distance gas supply are territorially embedded. Figure 1 illus-
trates how gas extraction and liquefaction stages, for example, are shaped by the develop-
mental aspirations of the host state (Territory 1), for which gas extraction and LNG export
are typically part of a strategy of resource-based development. Similarly, downstream
Territory 2Territory 1
Extraction
and
Processing
Liquefaction
FIRM A
NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES
(e.g., contract terms around price, destination)
FIRM B
LNG
Shipping Regasification
Transmission
and
Distribution
Consumption
Figure 1. Conceptualizing the LNG production network.
1 The difficulty of natural gas (a mixture of different gases that contains impurities, is highly flammable
and readily dissipates) is a staple feature of industrial accounts of the sector’s evolution. Kaup’s analysis
(2008) of the Bolivian gas sector noted that because natural gas requires modes of extraction, separation,
transport, and technological innovation that are capital intensive (and, accordingly, large scale), there are
only limited opportunities for local firms and/or the domestic state to control technological innovations
that enhance value capture (such as investment in gas-to-liquids technology to address local deficits in
liquid fuels such as diesel).
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elements are strongly influenced by the differential ways in which gas is embedded in
municipal and national energy markets (Territory 2), via electricity generation, for exam-
ple. We are aware that others have found this stage-based model of production limiting
because it may overlook differences among firms within individual stages as well as how
some actors may be involved in several stages in different ways (Coe and Yeung 2015).
However, a stage-based model of gas production based around key moments of material
transformation is well suited to analysis of LNG production networks. Historically the
LNG production chain has conformed to a simple organizational model in which upstream
and downstream stages have been internalized within the organizational structures of two
different firms (Firms A and B in Figure 1). By starting with a stage-based model, we are
able to show how, following processes of vertical and horizontal integration by lead firms,
the organizational structures of the production network no longer map straightforwardly
onto an underlying technical division of labor between upstream extraction and processing
and downstream distribution and consumption. Moreover, we are able to show how these
organizational shifts are, simultaneously, introducing significant new territorial forms to
LNG production networks.
Network Practices
GPN research has a comparatively granular approach to the organization of econom-
ic activity, focusing on the “intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm networks that charac-
terize contemporary production systems” (Hess and Coe 2006, 1207). The capacities of
GPN’s relational network perspective are well known for situating economic actors in
social and institutional context, emphasizing the significance of their interaction, and
understanding the contingency of economic processes (Bathelt and Glückler 2003).
However, the organizational practices that link buyers and sellers, align their interests,
and reproduce these relations over time and space—that is, which constitute relational
networks as networks (as opposed to intrafirm hierarchies, for example)—require
further elaboration. In the context of GPN research, for example, Murphy (2012)
highlighted a need for greater attention to the ways in which network agents establish,
maintain, and adapt network linkages. In his work on the international Bolivian wood
products industry, Murphy identified a range of ways in which actors develop ties to
international markets. He drew attention to the different strategies that Bolivian
supplies adopt in aligning their interests with international buyers and clients,
highlighting the importance of these network development practices to enhancing
relational proximity and creating network structures.
We take up Murphy’s call for greater attention to the socioeconomic process that
hold production networks together and maintain spatially distributed elements as a
functional whole. We agree that grounded “empirically informed exposition(s) of how
different production network configurations develop through the actions of agents” can
shed light on the processes behind emergent spatial forms (ibid., 210). Focusing on
practices of interaction and coordination complements the processual and evolutionary
understanding of territoriality, outlined above, in that it makes it possible to understand
the production network as a set of competing agendas and asymmetric power relations
through which the territorial configuration of a production network takes shape. Paying
attention to devices through which practices are negotiated and prescribed, such as
contract terms, enables an assessment of how spatial ties are created and modified over
time. Accordingly, the concept of network development practices (Figure 1) provides a
way to focus our analysis on key interactions between sellers and buyers that sustain
8
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the LNG production network, and that are important in understanding its changing
organizational structures and geographic form.
Researching LNG: An Introduction to the Sector and Our
Research Methods
In comparison to oil, natural gas consumption remains strikingly localized: nearly
three quarters of the natural gas consumed worldwide (70.5 percent in 2015, see
Figure 2) is consumed in the country where it was produced, in comparison to the
64.4 percent of global oil production that is exported (BP 2016). However, the
proportion of natural gas traded internationally has been increasing every year. A
growing proportion (32.4 percent in 2015) of the just over 1 trillion cubic meters of
gas traded internationally each year does so as LNG (Figure 2). Unbound by the fixed
infrastructure of pipelines, LNG introduces much greater geographic flexibility to
international gas trade and offers, for the first time, the prospect of a global gas market
analogous to that for oil. An increasing supply of flexible and relatively inexpensive
LNG is anticipated to be one of the most significant developments in the global energy
system in the remainder of this decade (IEA 2016).2 The growth of international trade
and cross-border investment in LNG is, then, part of a larger process of deepening
globalization under way within international energy markets such that national systems
of energy provision are increasingly porous (Bridge and Bradshaw 2015; Overland
2016).
At the core of the LNG production network is a process of capital-intensive material
transformation that upgrades the value of gas per unit volume. Liquefaction is achieved
by cooling natural gas to below its boiling point (−163°C), increasing its energy
Natural gas production worldwide
3538 bcm
International gas exports
1042 bcm
International LNG exports
338 bcm
Qatar LNG exports
106 bcm
Source: data from BP, 2016
Figure 2. World production and exports of natural gas and LNG, 2015 (billion cubic meters).
2 A recent analysis of global LNG markets by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies talks of the great
reconfiguration (Corbeau and Ledesma 2016).
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density six-hundred–fold (to about 65 percent that of crude oil), and substantially
improving the economics of gas transportation beyond the limits of the pipeline
network (i.e., by road tanker or by ship). Liquefaction is an example of a broad suite
of technological interventions that seek to overcome diseconomies of space (Bunker
and Ciccantell 2005), effectively creating a commodity by transforming materials from
one physical state to another. Its effect is to mobilize and globalize natural gas in
unprecedented ways. Ocean-borne LNG enables gas producers to monetize historically
stranded gas reserves and access large markets beyond the pipeline; it creates oppor-
tunities for arbitrage between regional markets, and enables utilities and other gas users
to diversify sources of supply. By mobilizing gas beyond the continental limits of
pipelines, the growth of LNG trade is disrupting established practices among buyers
and sellers along the gas supply chain and driving new patterns of uneven development
at the regional and global scale.3 Although LNG’s growing significance can be inter-
preted as the inexorable evolution of a commodity market (Pirrong 2014), such
accounts leave much unexplained. Where, when, and how (in a contractual sense)
LNG moves worldwide depends on how a diverse group of economic agents—includ-
ing international oil companies, state-owned oil and gas producers, sovereign govern-
ments, municipal utilities, shipping companies, and gas traders—are sustained in
relation with one another. Understanding the structures and practices that create and
maintain GPNs for LNG is essential, therefore, if we are to assess how LNG will
reshape existing geographies of gas and its implications for energy security, low carbon
energy transition, and other areas of policy concern. For gas importing states, for
example, LNG can provide a way to offset physical and price risks associated with
pipeline gas and other fuels: in a European context, the possibility of LNG imports
from North America is seen as a means of reducing reliance on Russian pipeline gas
imports and adding greater competition (Bordoff and Houser 2014; Coote 2016;
European Commission 2016). The case of LNG, then, readily captures how GPNs
are influenced by geopolitical considerations (cf. Glassman 2011).
To date, analysis of the geopolitical economy of LNG has been limited. There is
good quality trade literature (e.g., GIIGNL 2015; International Gas Union [IGU] 2015)
and several high-quality assessments conducted by consultancies, international agen-
cies, and independent research centers (Jensen 2004; Pöyry 2010; Standard Chartered
2011; Stern 2012; IEA 2014; Rogers 2015; Corbeau and Ledesma 2016). However,
such work tends to either focus on trade flows between states (reflecting a methodo-
logical nationalism common to work on international commodity trade) or provides
empirically rich assessments of key trends that eschew conceptualization or theoretical
development. At the same time, industry research tends to be uncritical in the sense that
it seeks to talk up the future prospects for the industry, and often specific regions and
projects, to reassure current and potential investors in the supply chain. Within
economic geography, there is growing interest in understanding the geographic politi-
cal economies of natural gas (e.g., Steen and Underthun 2011; Zalik 2011; Fry 2013;
Andrews and McCarthy 2014; Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, and Wochnik 2015; Bradshaw,
Dutton, and Bridge 2015). To date, however, there has been no systematic effort to
analyze the structures and dynamics of the LNG sector and their territorial
3 Although we focus here on the growth of the international seaborne LNG trade, small-scale liquefaction
is also increasingly associated with an inland truck-based retail trade in some gas markets where
distribution pipelines are weakly developed (e.g., in China). This LNG retail trade—supplying industrial
users that are off grid and the trucking industry—is frequently promoted by the LNG industry as a
potential growth market. The French-based multinational ENGIE (formerly GDF-Suez), for example,
estimates it could account for about 20 percent of the overall LNG market in 2030.
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consequences. Studies that have applied GPN to the natural gas sector have used it to
describe existing networks within a region rather than analyze their dynamic evolution:
Leung (2014) adopted the framework to evaluate the role of gas in China’s energy
transition and characterize its organizational forms, and Stephenson and Agnew (2016)
deployed a GPN framework to describe hydrocarbon production in the Russian Arctic.
The analysis in this article is informed by a two-year period of research focused on
understanding the changing position of the United Kingdom within global gas markets
associated with declining domestic gas production (from the North Sea) and growing
dependency on imported gas since 2004. The LNG component of this research exam-
ined the organizational structures through which LNG arrives in the United Kingdom,
the impact that significant changes in international gas markets had on LNG flows, and
the role of organizational structures and coordination strategies in modifying these
impacts in terms of the volume and timing of LNG imports.4 The project brought
together economic geographers, other social scientists, and energy analysts with spe-
cialist gas industry expertise. It involved desk-based research using secondary sources
(including annual corporate and sector overviews); sustained interactions with industry
specialists and senior level corporate representatives (via bespoke research meetings,
participation in international industry conferences, and the integration of gas analysts
as project partners); site visits to Qatar Petroleum’s facilities at Ras Laffan and the
UK’s LNG import terminals; and interviews (in the United Kingdom, United States,
and Qatar) with firms active in the United Kingdom and other gas markets. In structure
and purpose, both research meetings and interviews adhered to a model of close dialog
with industry practitioners as a means of deriving knowledge and “mak(ing) sense of
economic diversity in relation to broader . . . processes of economic change” (Clark
1998, 74). Interviews followed an open-ended and semistructured approach, and were
designed to develop an understanding of industry structures and observed practices
associated with investment in the LNG production network. Since gas contracts are
proprietary and their terms are rarely disclosed as a matter of public record, corporate
interviews and frequent discussions with industry specialists were an essential element
of the research, and enabled understanding to be built up through conversational
exchange and iteration as well as via more formal modes like triangulation. These
methods underpin the article’s analysis of the interconnected agents, processes, and
structures through which LNG is produced and distributed.
From LNG Trade to Production Networks
In this section we briefly review the evolution of the global LNG sector and highlight
significant changes in its territorial form since 2000.We then explain in the following section
how cross-border investment in network infrastructure and changing contract terms are
enabling a global market for LNG to emerge. Early commercial uses of liquefaction were
in local gas markets as a way to store gas in order to meet peaks in demand—a process
known as peak shaving. The application of LNG to address spatial (rather than temporal)
discontinuities in supply developed initially in the 1950s, although large-scale commercial
shipments of LNG began with the commissioning of exports from Algeria to the United
Kingdom and France in 1964. The early Mediterranean/Atlantic focus of LNG trade was
supplemented in the 1970s by deliveries from Alaska, Brunei, Indonesia, and Abu Dhabi
4 The funded research consisted of three linked elements, and focused on (1) the implications of the boom
in US shale gas production, (2) European pipeline networks, and (3) LNG. The project team included
specialist partners in the Gas Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (https://www.
oxfordenergy.org).
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(and later, Malaysia and Australia) into the Japanese market. From the mid-1970s onward,
Japan and the intra–Pacific Basin trade came to dominate LNG flows (over 70 percent in the
early 1980s), and most new export capacity developed in this period was associated with
Japan’s diversification away from oil (Vivoda 2014). The complexity of the global LNG
trade slowly increased with the emergence of Korea (1986) and then Taiwan (1990) as
significant LNG importers toward the end of the 1980s, and the entry of Trinidad and Tobago
and Qatar as LNG exporters in the late 1990s. Although the scale of LNG flows was
significant for the countries involved, the industry as a whole had a small number of players
and was regarded as a high-cost, niche sector reserved primarily for countries with limited
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Figure 3. Worldwide LNG Trade, 2001.
Source: authors, based on data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2002.
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access to pipeline gas. Historically, then, LNG has been a point-to-point trade from “dedi-
cated reserves to dedicated markets” so that the global LNG sector has consisted of
regionally discrete and largely independent projects (Tusiani and Shearer 2006, 67).
Since 2000, the scale and significance of LNG has grown markedly, and we briefly
outline here how LNG trade has increased in complexity and geographic scope
(Figures 3 and 4). The volume of LNG trade has more than doubled—from around
100 million metric tonnes per anum (MMTPA) in 2002 to over 248 MMTPA in 2015—
growing at average of 6 percent per annum between 2000 and 2014 (IGU 2016).
Global growth in liquefaction capacity has been led by Qatar, which experienced an 80
percent increase between 2006 and 2011 (Flower 2011). Qatar now accounts for a third
of all LNG exports, eclipsing the role of historic exporters (such as Algeria, Indonesia,
and Malaysia) in scale and reach through exports into both Atlantic and Pacific basins.
However, Australia is expected to surpass Qatar as the world’s largest LNG exporter in
2018, following major capacity expansion (an additional sixty-five million tons—
equivalent to 25 percent of current trade—are planned to come on stream in the next
few years) (Ledesma, Palmer, and Henderson 2014; Ripple 2014). A similar build-up
of export capacity is occurring in the United States, which became an LNG exporter in
early 2016 (IGU 2016).5 Other new exporters have also entered the LNG market since
2000—Russia, Yemen, Angola, Peru, Norway, Equatorial Guinea, Papua New Guinea
—raising the number of exporting countries to seventeen. At the same time, the
number of LNG importing countries doubled to thirty (including new flows to Latin
America [Brazil, Argentina, Chile] and the Middle East [Oman]). New regasification
capacity has run ahead of liquefaction and now stands at around three times the volume
of annual trade. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the growing extent and intensity of LNG
trade between 2002 and 2015, which has eroded, although not replaced, the long-
standing regional structure of LNG trade. Overall, LNG trade is anticipated to increase
more rapidly than pipeline gas in the remainder of the decade, although the situation in
the early 2020s is uncertain, since the current low oil price and the changing nature of
LNG trade itself are deferring investment in new gasification capacity (IEA 2015).
The expanding network of LNG infrastructure provides foundations for a more
globally integrated market in natural gas to emerge, similar to that for oil. Growth in
regasification capacity, for example, has enabled a significant spot market to develop,
along with a growing proportion of short-term (four years or less) agreements for the
sale and purchase of gas: together these now represent 29 percent of global LNG trade
(71.9 MMTPA) compared to less than 5 percent of the LNG market by volume in 2000
(IGU 2016). However, a series of shocks have disrupted a general trajectory of
increasing gas market integration via LNG (Bradshaw, Dutton, and Bridge 2015).
Three shocks, in particular, have exacerbated the geographic unevenness of gas market
globalization, and LNG flows and pricing terms continue to be strongly regionalized.
At the same time, these shocks have also contributed to new patterns of LNG trading,
the emergence of production networks that adopt nontraditional organizational forms,
and a diversification of contracts to include more flexible terms.
The loss of the United States as a potential LNG market constitutes the first shock.
Much of the new LNG export capacity put in place in the early 2000s was underpinned
5 The entry of the United States into the ranks of LNG exporters (as it is popularly described) in January
2016, with the first shipments from Cherniere’s Sabine Pass terminal on the Gulf Coast, refers only to
the lower–forty-eight states, since the United States has exported LNG from Alaska to Japan since 1969
via the Kenai LNG plant on the Cook Inlet. As of January 2016, sixty-two million tons of new capacity
is planned in the United States.
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by anticipated gas sales in the United States. However, US shale gas production since
2008 has driven down natural gas prices in North America, undermining the case for
large-scale LNG imports. In the short term, the reassertion of North America as a
largely self-contained gas island resulted in a surplus of LNG in the Atlantic basin,
with much of this gas finding its way into Europe (and Spain and the United Kingdom,
in particular), where it served to undermine the traditional long-term pricing system
that had evolved around pipeline gas. In the longer term, the availability of domestic
shale gas has encouraged the development of LNG export projects in both the United
States and Canada (Boersma 2015). As we explain below, the significance of these
export projects goes beyond the volumes of gas involved, since the terms under which
gas is sold from these projects effectively internationalizes the US domestic gas price
(Henry Hub6) as a global benchmark.
The Tohuku earthquake and resulting tsunami in Japan in March 2011 constitutes a
second shock, since it overwhelmed the Fukushima-Daichi nuclear power plant and led
to the shutdown of Japan’s nuclear electricity-generating capacity. The effect was to
substantially increase the demand for gas in power generation, driving up the price for
gas in the Japanese market and compounding a regional price divergence begun with
the decline of the US gas price as a result of the shale gale. At its peak, the spot price
in Japan was around $19 per million BTU, approximately double the price in European
markets and over four times that in the United States. The effect was to reassert the
dominance of Japan in LNG markets, draw spot cargoes toward Asian markets, and
drive LNG importers in Japan (and elsewhere in Asia) to seek alternative and more
sustainable pricing structures.
A third shock has been the fall in the price of oil since mid-2014. The drop in oil
price has consequences for LNG for two reasons: most LNG projects are undertaken by
oil and gas firms that have slashed expenditures on new project development; and most
gas sold in Asian markets (and around 40 percent of gas sales in European markets) is
indexed to the price of oil (rather than being based on gas-on-gas competition).
Traditionally LNG projects have utilized oil-indexed pricing as a way to cover the
relatively high costs of building liquefaction facilities. From a developer’s perspective,
the fall in the price of oil since 2014 “undermine(s) the rationale for relying on this
pricing basis as the ‘gold standard’ for underpinning the economics of high cost-base
LNG projects” (Rogers 2015, 47). Ironically, the previous period of high oil prices had
led LNG importers—particularly in Japan—to question the logic of oil indexation and
to explore alternative benchmarks for pricing gas, such as the US Henry Hub.
LNG Production Networks: Erosion of the Traditional
Floating Pipeline Model
Increases in LNG production and slowing demand growth have resulted in a period
of significant oversupply, creating opportunities for new actors and a diversification in
the organizational and territorial forms of LNG’s production network. LNG’s tradition-
al organizational model integrated core upstream phases of gas production, liquefac-
tion, and shipping within the structure of a single entity (Kay and Roberts 2012). In
early LNG projects (such as those of Pertamina in Indonesia or Sonatrach in Algeria)
resource production, liquefaction, and shipping were vertically integrated within the
6 Henry Hub is a key trading point for natural gas in the United States. Occupying a central node in the
gas transmission system, and located near Erath in Louisiana, Henry Hub has been the delivery point for
the NYMEX gas futures contract since 1990.
14
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
structure of the national oil company. The production and export of LNG effectively
extended the developmental state’s role in securing value from sovereign resources. In
parallel, downstream stages of regasification, transmission, and gas consumption were
also often integrated within a single organizational structure: in Korea, for example,
this has taken the form of a national monopoly buyer, KOGAS (until recently the
world’s largest LNG buyer); in Japan it has been municipal or regional gas and electric
utility companies (such as Tokyo Electric Power Company, Chubu Electric Power
Company, and Shizuoka Gas Co).
Since the capital costs of liquefaction are very high (and represent about 50 percent
of total chain costs), and LNG plants have limited operational flexibility with regard to
output volumes, commercial production of LNG is dependent on securing downstream
markets able to absorb supply (Pöyry 2010).7 LNG production networks have therefore
tended to assume a project character: the capital-intensive liquefaction stage is devel-
oped in association with both upstream (extractive) infrastructure and downstream
import terminals, and underwritten by the value of long-term contracts (twenty-five
years) committing buyers to take specified volumes of gas. Such long-term contracts
have been essential to securing project finance to cover the cost of building the LNG
plant and associated infrastructure as “without a meaningful commitment of a buyer (or
buyers) to purchase the requisite volumes of LNG at an acceptable price and for the
intended project duration, there would be no project” (Kay and Roberts 2012, 20; see
also Douglass 2012). LNG projects, then, have traditionally brought together two
territorial entities—a national seller and a national or regional buyer—via long-term,
take-or-pay sale and purchase agreements. In these projects, integrated oil companies
(IOCs) provide access to technology, often via a third-party engineering company (such
as the German company Linde in the case of the cryogenic elements of the LNG plant),
and project management and gas marketing experience. In regard to pricing, the
balance of power between buyers and sellers in the traditional model rested largely
with LNG producers, with buyers willing to pay a premium to secure supplies. This
model was a direct product of the dominance of Japanese buyers in the expansion of
the LNG sector where there was no pipeline alternative. Contracts allocated volume
risk to buyers and price risk to suppliers, acting as “linchpins” linking the different
elements of the LNG chain (Farmer and Sullivan 2012, 29).8
This organizational model has characterized LNG since its establishment in the 1960s. It
has given the industry its distinctive structure of “a series of virtually self-contained projects
made up of interlinking chains of large-scale facilities, requiring huge capital investments,
bound together by long-term contracts, and subject to intensive oversight by host govern-
ments and international organizations at every stage of the process” (Tusiani and Shearer
2006, 4). The combination of integrated organizational structures, limited infrastructure, and
contract terms binding a high proportion of production to particular buyers meant LNG
production networks functioned, in effect, as a floating pipeline ferrying gas from a discrete
7 Capital costs have risen sharply in the last decade: in 2013 they stood at around $1,200 per tonne LNG
per year, implying a large liquefaction train (around 8 MMTPA) may cost in the range of $8–9 billion
(Songhurst 2014). Pöyry (2010) indicated capital expenditure for an 8 MMTPA liquefaction plant at $6–
10 billion, with this component significantly larger than shipping ($1–2.5 billion) or regasification ($1–
1.5 billion).
8 In the dominant Asian market, for example, contracts price LNG against the so-called Japanese Crude
Cocktail (or more properly the Japanese Custom Cleared Crude Oil Price, a weighted average price for
crude imports to Japan) and the inclusion of a pricing cap—the so-called s-curve—protects buyers and
sellers against large price swings (Farmer and Sullivan 2012).
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source of supply to a discretemarket (Tusiani and Shearer 2006): in other words, the potential
spatial flexibility afforded by oceangoing gas trade was, in practice, highly constrained.
Diversification of Production Network Structures
The traditional model (A in Figure 5) has been eroded over time and is on the cusp of
significant change. In this section, we identify three significant organizational trends (B, C,
and D in Figure 5) in the contemporary global LNG sector and consider their implications.
First, a process of vertical disintegration and specialization (B) has increased the number of
actors in LNGproduction networks. In the critical area of shipping, for example, independent
LNG shipping fleets—that is, not owned, managed, or operated by upstream gas producers
(e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Teekay, Golar, Dynagas, and Höegh)—increasingly supplement
the large fleets constructed and financed as part ofmajor LNGprojects andmanaged by LNG
producers (e.g., Qatar Gas, Shell, BP). Independent carriers conclude long-term shipping and
service agreements (time charter contracts) with LNGproducers for the transport of their gas.
They facilitate the growing market for short-term and spot gas sales, and are central to the
growing geographic flexibility of LNG trade.
The process of specialization and vertical disintegration in LNG extends beyond
shipping to liquefaction and regasification, with the emergence of business models in
which these facilities are operated on either a merchant or tolling basis (Miles 2013). In
liquefaction, for example, merchant and tolling models separate the ownership of the
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Figure 5. Organizational trends in the LNG production network.
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liquefaction facility from the ownership of upstream gas supply: in the merchant
model, the owner of the LNG plant purchases gas and sells the resulting LNG; in the
tolling model, the owner of the LNG plant does not take ownership of the gas but is
paid a fee for the option to access physical processing capacity. The nascent US LNG
export market is emerging around a tolling model with owners of gas paying a service
fee for access to liquefaction capacity.9 Tolling models are emerging at the regasifica-
tion end of the LNG production network, with regasification and storage capacity
constructed by companies that are neither LNG producers nor downstream gas con-
sumers and operated on a fee-for-service basis.10 The growth of infrastructure and the
emergence of big price differentials in regional markets have also created conditions
for the entry of third parties. New network participants include banks (Merrill Lynch,
Barclays Capital, Société Générale, and JP Morgan) and commodity trading houses
(Vitol, Trafigura, and Gunvor) that operating outside of long-term contracts, seek to
capture value from the spatial flexibility that LNG affords, moving gas to markets with
temporary shortages (ICIS 2010). Overall, the fragmentation described above has
increased the number and diversity of actors in the LNG production network, enhanc-
ing its organizational and territorial flexibility relative to the traditional model.
Second, the traditional binational character of LNG projects has been eroded in a
significant way by cross-border investments along the production network. This
reflects, in part, the liberalization of national policies governing energy investment
enabling nondomestic companies to take an equity stake and assume operational
control of key assets such as liquefaction and regasification plants and the infrastruc-
tures of gas consumption (utilities, power generation). Transnational investments in the
liquefaction phase of the LNG production network are dominated by joint-venture
arrangements between national oil companies and the IOCs—notably Shell, BP, Total,
Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and ENI. A number of state oil and gas firms, such as
Malaysia’s Petronas and PetroChina (both partners in proposed LNG export plants in
British Columbia, for example), are also active as transnational investors in upstream
LNG. The growing significance of cross-border investment also reflects a process of
forward and backward integration (C and D, respectively, in Figure 5) occurring along
the LNG production network, since downstream firms invest in assets upstream (and
vice versa) in order to share risk and capture value. Examples include gas trading and
marketing firms taking equity positions in new LNG plants (e.g., Japan-based
Mitsubishi and Mitsui in Sakhalin Energy or similarly Mitsubishi’s participation as
an upstream investor in LNG projects around the world), and participation by utilities
(e.g., Tokyo Gas, Osaka Gas, Engie, Gas Natural Fenosa) in shipping and/or
9 This model is being adopted, for example, at Cheniere Energy’s terminal at Sabine Pass in Louisiana and
is also the framework for a number of the country’s other proposed export plants (Persilly 2013). The
tolling model for liquefaction is enabled by the liquidity of the US gas market and the density of gas
supply infrastructure. It also reflects the way proposed US LNG export facilities are essentially a
strategic response to changed market conditions not by upstream resource holders but by companies
owning land and facilities originally intended as LNG import terminals, and that have access to venture
capital seeking relatively short-term returns.
10 The Grain import terminal in the United Kingdom, for example, is run by the national transmission
system operator (National Grid) on a commercial tolling basis: National Grid neither imports LNG into
Grain nor sells gas from it on its own account, but it sells capacity rights to a range of upstream LNG
producers and downstream utilities. A similar model is associated with the rapid growth of floating
storage and regasification units (FSRU). Moored offshore, these units allow municipal, regional, or
national gas networks to expand and diversify gas imports by tapping into global LNG. Specialist
companies (e.g., Höegh LNG, Excelerate Energy) build and operate the FSRU and market regasifica-
tion capacity to those owning LNG or seeking to import gas.
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liquefaction stages via equity holdings such as the stake of South Korea’s KOGAS in
the Prelude (10 percent) and Gladstone (15 percent) LNG projects in Australia (Tusiani
and Shearer 2006). This pattern of transnational coventuring in LNG projects is largely
obscured by conventional national analyses of upstream assets: for example, over 90
percent of LNG imports to the United Kingdom come from Qatar, but the LNG project
from which the bulk of these imports are sourced (Qatargas II) is a coventure of Total,
Exxon Mobil, and Qatar Petroleum. The process of forward integration involves own-
ers of resource and liquefaction assets acquiring market access by taking equity
positions in, or concluding capacity agreements with, owners of regasification
terminals.11
Third, the discrete, point-to-point character of current LNG trade is also being
reworked through a process of horizontal integration, since upstream and downstream
companies take positions across multiple LNG projects. At the upstream end, IOCs,
like Shell and BP, have well-established LNG trading arms (e.g., Shell Eastern Trading,
BP Singapore) that source supply from the various projects in which they are partners.
These arrangements are reflected in the emergence of an aggregator business model in
which suppliers use portfolio flexibility to source gas from anywhere rather than from a
single captive project. The BG Group (now part of Shell) adopted the aggregator
model, building downstream market positions in the United Kingdom, United States,
and Singapore, and a portfolio of flexible LNG volumes that could be sourced from
north Africa, west Africa, and the Caribbean. By not being tied to a single project, the
portfolio reduces supply risks for LNG buyers—especially when contracting to new
liquefaction projects that are frequently delayed, and enables suppliers to optimize
across a suite of assets. The portfolio organizational form is the clearest expression of
an alternative to the floating pipeline model, which has characterized the historic
evolution of LNG.
Changing Network Practices
The volume, timing, and destination of LNG flows are governed by the contracts
concluded between buyers and sellers of LNG. Contracts are a critical “network
development practice” in the sense implied by Murphy (2012, 211): that is, they are
“mutually coherent, recognizable, and legitimated practices (through which) business-
people develop relational proximity with each other” (ibid.). It is through contracts that
the relational proximity that defines the LNG production network is achieved, with
power relations between buyers and sellers shaping contract terms. The diversification
of organizational forms and the growing complexity of LNG production networks
described above are changing long-established contract practices with significant
implications for the geographies of LNG trade. In general terms, these changes reflect
a shift in market power within LNG production networks toward buyers associated
with growing depth and liquidity of LNG markets: however, as we illustrate below, this
is geographically very uneven. Contract terms are becoming more variegated over time
as new practices around destination flexibility, volume flexibility, and price emerge
(Table 1). Taken together, these nontraditional network development practices are
11 A similar process of overseas downstream investment to secure market access characterized LNG
import terminal construction in the United States in the 1990s and early 2000s. Prior to the growth of
domestic shale gas production: Qatar Petroleum, Exxon Mobil, and Conoco Phillips, for example,
constructed Golden Pass, one of the world’s largest LNG import terminals, at Sabine Pass, Texas
(Golden Pass has subsequently sought to redevelop the facilities as an LNG export terminal on a
merchant model [Miles 2013]).
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causing LNG production networks to function less like floating pipelines, contributing
to a more geographically integrated and liquid market. We focus here on two: destina-
tion flexibility and pricing.
Destination Flexibility
A growing number of LNG contracts allow for flexibility in cargo destination. In the
historic mode, buyers were prohibited, by the terms of the contract, from landing a cargo at
any other import terminal than that named in the contract (i.e., the buyer’s facilities). This
primarily reflected the interests of sellers who, whether for pricing, marketing, or financial
reasons (e.g., export credit agency support for LNG plant construction was conditional on a
proportion of cargoes being landed in a domestic market) wanted to restrict the ability of
buyers to sell the cargo in a different market (Ashurst 2009). However, buyers are
increasingly negotiating into contracts the right to divert cargoes, enabling them to trade
LNG more widely. This process is more advanced in the Atlantic market, particularly in
relation to contracts concluded for LNG export from the United States, but the process is
also growing in significance in the Pacific basin. It is also associated with a greater use of
free on board (FOB) terms in sale and purchase agreements, which give the buyer
responsibility for delivery and destination. The traditional model, which still dominates
sales in Asian and most European markets, specified delivery ex-ship (DES) and made the
seller responsible for delivery (typically to a specified point). Although it is possible to
write destination flexibility into DES contracts, the buyer is still beholden to the seller for
delivery, and so diversion requires the seller’s agreement. The growing use of FOB terms
places destination within the buyer’s control, affording flexibility in where the cargo is
traded and enabling buyers to seek out arbitrage opportunities (Kay and Roberts 2012).
National and international policy commitments to liberalize energy markets have also
taken aim at destination clauses: the G7 has committed to “promote flexible gas markets”
via relaxation of destination clauses, and under EU competition law, sale and purchase
agreements involving the European Union cannot contain destination restrictions (Platts
2014; see also Weem n.d.; Farmer and Sullivan 2012). The effect of growing destination
flexibility in the contract terms that structure LNG production networks is that a growing
proportion of LNG is tradeable, since it is no longer bound to a particular destination.
Pricing Innovation
The territorially embedded character of LNG markets—derivative of regional energy
histories and the availability of alternative sources (such as pipeline gas)—has given
rise to regionally distinctive pricing regimes. The LNG sold in Asia, and in continental
Europe (apart from the Netherlands and Belgium), has traditionally been priced against
crude oil. In the United States and the United Kingdom, however, gas prices are
disclosed through the market and reflect an energy infrastructure that enables gas-on-
Table 1
Changing Network Practices: Comparison of Traditional and Emergent Contract Characteristics
Traditional Contract Characteristics Emergent Contract Characteristics
Long-term, take-or-pay obligations Shorter-term, options on delivery
Limited off-take flexibility Flexibility in off-take volumes
No destination flexibility Flexibility in delivery points
Oil-indexation of prices (outside United States/United Kingdom) Pressure on oil indexation, hub benchmarking
Limited options for review/reopening Contract reopening
Source: Based on Tusiani and Shearer (2006), supplemented with other sources.
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gas competition: LNG pricing in the United States references the physical gas trading
point of Henry Hub in Louisiana; in the United Kingdom, prices reference the national
balancing point, a virtual location in the national transmission system. These different
pricing regimes mean that two broad patterns of LNG production networks have
emerged, differentiated by the markets into which LNG is sold: one linked to oil
indexation and representing the bulk of LNG trade and a cornerstone of the traditional
model described above; the other—an emergent model—linked to hub pricing in
relatively liquid markets. In the latter case, the LNG importer has to accept the
prevailing domestic market price, and the United Kingdom, for example, tends to be
the market of last resort.
Since 2008 prices between the Henry Hub and Asia (JCC) have sharply diverged, driven
initially by growing domestic US production of shale gas (Bradshaw, Dutton, and Bridge
2015) and compounded by the shutdown of the nuclear power fleet in Japan and South
Korea (which created an additional demand for gas). The scale and persistence of this price
difference (which was as much as $15 per MMBTU) has encouraged innovation in LNG
pricing. On the one hand, it spurred gas importers in Asia to review prevailing pricing
structures, develop alliances that increase their market power, and seek greater transparen-
cy around price in the Asian markets (e.g., the Japan OTC Exchange, and Platts Japan-
Korea Marker Price). In 2015, for example, Chubu Electric and Tokyo Electric Power
Company, two of the largest buyers in Japan, created a downstream LNG purchasing
alliance with a combined annual volume of around 35–40 MMTPA. On the other hand,
buyers like Chubu Electric sought to offload the volume risk associated with the traditional
model, pursuing greater destination flexibility, negotiating FOB contract terms, and by
entering into joint procurement with overseas buyers. More generally, the growing depth of
the LNG market has encouraged buyers to seek mid- to short-term contracts once long-
term contracts come up for renewal and to turn for an increasing proportion of their
demand to the spot market.Most recently, and most significantly, the Japanese government
has used its presidency of the G7 to put forward a strategy to promote the development of a
flexible and liquid LNG market to establish an LNG trading hub in Asia (Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry [METI] 2016). Unsurprisingly, traditional suppliers have
sought to defend oil indexation, and there is now the potential for significant commercial
conflict over pricing between producers and purchasers in Asian markets (Stern 2016),
exacerbating the uncertainty facing those seeking to invest in new liquefaction capacity in
the early 2020s.
Innovations in pricing are significant because they exemplify a process of experimentation
currently under way in LNG production networks as suppliers and buyers seek to reallocate
risk. They are also a product of a shift in the power balance in favor of LNG purchasers.
Experimentation, in the form of emergent network practices—such as destination flexibility
and pricing discussed here—is eroding the regionalized character of LNG production net-
works. The appearance of Henry Hub pricing in LNG contracts for sale in Japan (which has
been dominated by oil indexation) indicates how LNG is respatializing gas markets: the
reference to Henry Hub carries material and infrastructural conditions that are characteristic
of one highly regionalized market (the United States) into another (Japan). Although this
trend has been slowed by the impact of falling oil prices, it shows how production networks
and network development practices, rather than simply physical commodity trade, are driving
gas market integration.
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Conclusion
A global gas market is emerging enabled by major investments in the infrastructures for
producing, shipping, and consuming LNG. Although claims for a global gas market are
premature, the LNG sector is at a pivotalmoment in its evolution.Most analyses of this sector
—and of international energy markets more generally—focus on international trade flows in
energy commodities, rather than on the cross-border production networks through which this
trade is organized. In this article we have adopted a GPN approach focused on the actors and
relational practices that influence where, when, and how gas moves beyond the limits of
continental pipelines. This approach has enabled us to show how a dominant traditional
model is being rapidly reworked in the context of growing LNG supply, identifying a process
of organizational and territorial experimentation as buyers, suppliers, and other actors have
sought new ways to reallocate risk and capture value. Although an LNG production network
has been around for over fifty years,we have shownhow it is only recently that organizational
structures and network development practices have emerged that depart from the floating
pipeline model and enable LNG’s potential geographic flexibility to be realized.
To account for the processes shaping the globalization of gas markets, our analysis has
mobilized three conceptual elements: territoriality, materiality, and network practices. The
LNG production network is an exemplar par excellence of how the materiality of commodi-
ties is integral (rather than incidental) to the geographies of their circulation, presenting
barriers to and opportunities for the rescaling of markets. We have approached LNG as a
particular techno-material configuration of natural gas that enables it to be moved and sold
beyond the traditional limits of pipeline. Material transformation (from gas to liquid, from
liquid to gas) and material stabilization (e.g., maintaining gas as a liquid for transport and
storage) create opportunities for value capture, although the technical challenges and large
capital costs involved restrict these opportunities to particular actors. A techno-material
perspective, focused on how the material properties of natural gas enable and constrain the
pursuit of value, therefore, sheds light on the expansion of international markets for natural
gas and the organization of LNG production networks. In its own, however, it is unable to
account for significant recent changes in the organization and territorial configuration of the
LNGproduction network.A keymaterial aspect of LNG (the creation of discrete, oceanborne
cargoes) has always given it a much higher degree of potential spatial flexibility than pipeline
gas, but in practice this potential has been highly constrained and the LNG production
network has operated as a set of largely separate floating pipelines. The concept of territorial-
ity provides away to understand how andwhyLNG’s long-established territorial form is now
changing. In turning to territorialitywe have endeavored to retain something of the processual
and explanatory (rather than spatially descriptive) meaning associated with its early applica-
tion to geographic political economy.As a top-level concept, the value of territoriality is that it
simultaneously leans forward to highlight a significant global shift under way in the geogra-
phies of the LNGproduction network and backward to the strategies and practices of network
actors throughwhich these spatial configurations aremade.Our account of territoriality in the
LNG production network is empirically grounded in the multiple activities of buyers, sellers,
and other actors. The concept of network development practices provides a finer-grained
analytical tool for sorting through these detailed activities, identifying key practices that hold
the production network together and that have a key influence on its emergent territorial form.
The article has provided the first systematic analysis within economic geography of the
globalization of the LNG sector and its influence on global gas markets. It makes two
significant contributions. First, adopting a GPN approach and foregrounding the question
of territoriality discloses significant changes in organizational structures and network territo-
rial forms that a focus on energy technologies, resources, or patterns of gas trade is unable to
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reveal. The new organizational structures and network practices emerging in the LNG
production network are integral to the ways in which gas is becoming globalized, and they
have significant geoeconomic and geopolitical implications. Contract flexibility and the
growth of tradeable LNG create new uncertainties that are strategically significant for gas
exporters and importers, and for future investment in network infrastructure. Increased
flexibility around contracts and pricing may promote an increasingly globalized market,
but it is unclear whether the associated lack of surety (in terms of future income streams) can
finance the next generation of LNG projects: accordingly, there is potential for supply
shortages in the 2020s if demand growth picks up as expected. Moreover, the erosion of
the traditional model is geographically uneven. Importers in Japan and South Korea have
evolved dedicated supply structures for which they pay a premium, whereas in Europe—and
increasingly in China—LNG competes against domestic sources and pipeline gas. There is a
growing commitment in Europe to marshal the flexibility of LNG to counter dependence on
Russian pipeline gas imports, but LNG flows into Europe wax and wane depending on the
relative price of alternative gas sources, providing limited supply security. From an LNG
importing country policy perspective, there is a balance to be struck between achieving
physical gas security through network practices that lock in dedicated supply (the Asian
model) compared to a market-based form of security where the critical determinant is the
price necessary to secure LNG imports (as in the United Kingdom). In sum, our analysis of
theLNGproduction network demonstrates the potential ofGPN for contributing new insights
into the emergence, organization, and scaling of contemporary energy markets, and their
economic and political implications.
Second, we have shown how an emergent territorial form (a global gas market) is enabled
and shaped by the actors and relations internal to a production network.Our analysis identifies
howactors in theLNGsector, and the organizational structures and network practices through
which they are functionally integrated, have a central role in the emergence of a globalmarket
for gas. The practices of buyers and sellers in the LNG production network—to align
interests, allocate risk, and capture value—make themarket and shape its emergent territorial
form (cf. Hamilton, Petrovic, and Senauer 2011). Their combined effects are changing the
way gas is bought and sold and, at the same time, creating new geographies of gas that
encompass international trade, cross-border investment, and price formation. A global gas
market, in short, is neither self-organizing nor an ineluctable force, but rather an emergent
property of the LNGproduction network. The article has responded to calls formore process-
sensitive accounts ofGPNs by focusing on the relationship between organizational structures,
network practices, and territorial form. In doing so, we hope to have realized more fully
GPN’s potential for analyzing network territoriality by recognizing how network territoriality
is constitutive of markets, rather than merely responsive to them.
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